The Wagners in Africa: Military Power and Economic Interests
Russia, May 18, 2025 – While Russia’s influence in Ukraine is being watched live, its covert penetration into Africa is less visible but just as crucial. The Wagner Group has become a tool of power projection here, linking violence, raw materials and geopolitics into one deadly system.
Since 2017, the Russian mercenary group Wagner has become a significant player in the African security space. Its members have appeared in conflict zones in the Central African Republic, Mali, Libya and Sudan, offering military assistance to the regimes in exchange for access to natural resources. Wagner has not operated here as a traditional army, but as a hybrid structure combining the power of a private security agency, a business corporation and an intelligence network. The Wagner Group’s presence in Africa is neither accidental nor marginal. It is part of Moscow’s broader effort to weaken Western influence in a key region where classic forms of intervention have failed. In Russian geopolitics of the 21st century, Africa has become a laboratory for a new type of conflict: without rules, without responsibility, and with maximum yield. Mercenaryism here is not just a tool of combat, but part of an economic model that benefits from instability.
Main African operational areas
The Wagner Group’s most well-known operations on the African continent are in the Central African Republic (CAR), where they have been present since 2018. Officially, they operate as a military advisory team, but in reality they have their own training center in Bereng and units that escort convoys, protect government facilities, and protect President Faustin-Archange Touadéry. Their deployment was instrumental in keeping the central government from collapsing during the 2020 uprising. In return, they received concessions to mine gold and diamonds through Midas Ressources, a company operating in the Ndassima region. Wagner also runs disinformation campaigns, runs its own media, and influences public opinion.
Another key area of operation is Mali, where the Wagner Group replaced French troops after their withdrawal in 2022. The entry was made possible by the military junta that took power after a coup and was looking for a new protector against Islamist groups. In Mali, they operate in zones controlled by the army, but at the same time face accusations of serious human rights violations – in particular the massacre in the village of Moura, in which, according to the UN, more than 500 civilians died (OHCHR report from May 2023). In return for these services, Wagner received access to gold mining and a share in military contracts. At the same time, their presence has significantly strengthened anti-government resentment among a part of the population, which increases the risk of further destabilization of the region. A significant, albeit less media-exposed area of operation for the Wagner Group is Libya, where they have supported Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army since 2019. Their activities include technical support, drone operation and security of oil facilities, mainly in the Sirte area. The Russian interest here lies in geopolitical influence in the Mediterranean and access to key logistical routes, including potential sea access. The fourth significant area is Sudan, where Wagner, through Meroe Gold, mined gold in cooperation with the RSF paramilitary units led by General Hemedti. This activity here is an example of deep connections with the local elite – in exchange for training and equipment, Wagner gained access to gold mines, the proceeds of which were smuggled to Russia or the United Arab Emirates.
Economic interests and mechanisms of operation of the Wagner Group
One of the key features of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa is the linking of military operations with economic profits, primarily in the field of natural resource extraction. This model combines traditional mercenaryism with post-colonial exploitation: in exchange for military support or protection of regimes, Wagner gains access to gold, diamond or uranium mines. The profits are legalized through a network of shell companies that operate in cooperation with local governments. In the SAR, for example, Midas Ressources operates the mines, while Sewa Security Services officially provides “security consulting.” In practice, however, both entities function as instruments for the systematic draining of the country’s wealth. The extracted raw materials are often smuggled through unofficial channels, outside any customs oversight. For example, in the case of Sudan, investigations by Global Witness and later the UN showed that Wagner operatives ensured the export of gold from RSF-controlled areas, with the profits either ending up in Prigozhin’s business empire or being reinvested in other operations. This circulation of capital creates an economic autonomy that has enabled the Wagners to sustain themselves for a long time without official funding from the Russian state budget. At the same time, this mechanism allows the Russian state to deny responsibility and maintain “plausible deniability.”
In addition to natural resources, Wagner is also involved in other sectors: protection of mining facilities, logistics, construction and information operations. In many African countries, they operate “media centers” that create pro-Russian content, discredit the opposition or disparage the West. For example, in Mali and the CAR, they operate propaganda platforms on social networks, where they combine Russian nationalism with local resentments towards former colonizers. This creates an information environment favorable to their own operations, thereby increasing the willingness of local governments to cooperate with them. The economic activity of the Wagners is thus a complex hybrid operation: not only profitable, but also geopolitically functional.
After Prigozhin: the continuity and transformation of the Wagners in Africa
The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023 in a plane crash that followed his unsuccessful uprising against the Russian Ministry of Defense raised questions about the future of the Wagner Group not only in Russia, but also on the African continent. Western observers expected the structure to disintegrate or become marginalized, but developments have shown transformation rather than liquidation. Moscow has decided to maintain key Wagner activities, especially in Africa, where they represent an important instrument of Russian foreign policy. Many of the existing contracts have been transferred to state-run entities such as Rosgvardiya or GUR, but field personnel have often remained unchanged.
At the local level, in countries such as Mali, the SAR or Libya, there is a formal change in designation, not activity. Soldiers who previously operated under the Wagner brand now operate as the “Russian military contingent”, “advisors to the Ministry of Defense”, or within newly created structures such as the Africa Corps, which reports directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense. This reorganization allows the Kremlin greater control over foreign activities and eliminates the risk of loss of loyalty that was associated with Prigozhin’s independent position. At the same time, however, economic operations continue through the original corporate networks, suggesting that the hybrid model – military-economic-information – remains intact.
In the future, we can expect the continuation of Russian activity in Africa under the “post-Wagner” brand, with the new structures likely to be even more closely linked to the Russian state. The strategy remains unchanged: to offer regimes security in exchange for raw materials, geopolitical influence and diplomatic loyalty. While Europe and the US seek to restore trust through development aid or multilateral missions, Russia offers direct and unostentatious support to regimes that have no choice. The result is the consolidation of an alternative security order in which democratic values are not decisive, but efficiency and the ability to eliminate threats. Wagner, in whatever form, thus remains a key factor in African security – still operating in the gray area between the state, the market and violence.
Peter North
