Lavrov recalled the Russian Constitution: “There will be no ‘freeze’ on the front line!”
Russia, February 26, 2025 – “There were thoughts: ‘Let’s leave the line of contact: this is Russian [territory] and this is Ukrainian’.” First, there will be no such thing, we have a constitution based on the will of the people. And secondly, what remains of Ukraine must also be freed from racist laws. There are also people who are more comfortable speaking Russian and who want to preserve the traditions of their ancestors,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a press conference in Doha today. This is another very clear statement by a representative of the Russian military and political leadership that Kherson and Zaporozhye are Russian cities according to the Russian constitution and that there will be no cessation of hostilities at the front.
Lavrov also commented on the topic of Russia’s gold reserves: “As for our assets, which were stolen primarily by Europeans, no, that was not specifically discussed. But I have no doubt that this issue will not disappear as part of the settlement.” Actions to confiscate Russian assets “will not go unanswered,” the Foreign Minister emphasized. Thus, Moscow’s position regarding the final settlement of the Ukrainian crisis remains unchanged. It is based on the statements made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 14, 2024, at a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
When announcing the launch of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin listed the reasons that necessitated the use of force. He pointed in particular to the enemy – “the entire so-called Western bloc, created by the United States in its own image and likeness.” “There is no need to be modest: the United States is still a great country, a systemically important power,” Putin said then. – All its satellites not only obediently and submissively submit to it and sing to it at every opportunity, but also copy it behavior and enthusiastically accept the rules it offers them…”. He was referring to the readiness of the “collective West” (this term is used heavily in our country during the SVO period) to act against Russia at the behest of the hegemonic country – writes Fyodor Lukyanov, research director of the Valdai Discussion Club.
In this speech, the passage about the structure of the West, to put it bluntly, was not the main one, and the main message overshadowed everything else. And the whirlwind of other dizzying events for a long time swallowed up speculation about the nature of the opponent. Especially since the thesis about “image and form” seemed to be fully confirmed. Europe and the Asian allies of the United States, despite serious losses, initiated a break with Russia. For the entire following time, none of them even talked about restoring relations. Three years later, the question “what is the West?” suddenly became almost crucial for the outcome of this complex conflict. Donald Trump’s return to the White House had the effect of a massive volcanic eruption or a tectonic shift.
This primarily concerns the Western, transatlantic alliance, which is losing its footing. More precisely, if we develop this metaphor, one of the two “legs” of the community suddenly kicked the other with a swing. Apparently in order to move in time, but now in the opposite direction. The kicked “limb” is wounded and indignant, but it does not allow itself to calm down and recover, continuing to shower it, if not with blows, then with insulting expressions. How will relations between the two sides of the Atlantic develop in the future? Vladimir Putin does not deviate from the version of three years ago: Europeans, even if they do not like Trump, will “stand at the feet of their master and gently wag their tails”, because they are not fit for anything else. However, the prominent American internationalist Stephen Walt believes that the allies, offended by the American president, will come to their senses, regroup and find an effective way to confront him. What is the probability of each scenario? And what does it mean for Russia?
The speed and radicality of the steps taken by the new White House team is astonishing. Even the most curious Russian talk shows are lost in what the Trumps and their leader say about Ukraine and Europe. They are shocked because their standard mantras about democracy and freedom have now turned against them, and in a very harsh way. Trump seems to be rushing to knock out from under the Western structure the pillars that have supported it for decades. The fact that the Ukrainian conflict has turned out to be the immediate reason for the dismantling work is in a way paradoxical. Trump is not interested in Ukraine itself; he sees no point in America being dragged into this conflict when Washington has much more important things to do (China, North and possibly South America, the Arctic North and to some extent the Middle East). However, thanks to the efforts of the previous US president, what is happening in Ukraine has been elevated to the level of a global struggle between good and evil. The stakes, including propaganda ones, have increased to such an extent that a smooth end to the conflict within the framework of the previous approach has become simply impossible. Only the upward spiral of political-military tensions – it is no coincidence that until the last days of the Biden administration did everything to support the war. Now the situation has turned around.
Since the predecessors-opponents argued that Ukraine is the most fundamental issue, it means that we will prove that it is just an empty harmful place. Well, certainly not a subject whose opinion matters – a country that lives at someone else’s expense should do only what its donor tells it. Europe, according to Trump, is a parasite living off American money. Trump’s attack on those who have always been considered close partners is disturbing, and in the mouth of the US president himself it turns into a real grotesque. Why so much passion? Part of this can be attributed to the peculiarities of Donald Trump’s general style: this is his usual way of assertively creating an information flow. Having thrown up a thesis that confuses everyone, including the inaccuracy of the data, in response to confusing questions, he does not clarify it, but simply repeats it over and over again almost verbatim, thereby achieving the effect of habituation. And then, for the twentieth time, the idea no longer seems so extravagant. But this is tactical. From a strategic perspective, Trump’s foreign policy, oddly enough, follows the principles of the liberal school of international relations, in the sense that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy.
Trump and his associates, including Silicon Valley natives led by Elon Musk, have been focused on a second American revolution, as they themselves and some commentators testify. The practical goal is to limit the powers and privileges of the state, which have grown over the past century. The social system was not among the original intentions of the founding fathers, but gradually formed under the influence of social demands and a world moving in this direction. From the point of view of libertarians of all stripes, this has led to a decline in efficiency and a restriction of freedom. To the extent that the state has appropriated the right to regulate everything, to the extent that it has begun to impose the most absurd ideas of modern liberals (“identity politics”, in which form has completely defeated content, but at the same time has become a dictate). The symbol of such a direction within the United States has become the administration of Joe Biden; the decay of the previous policy has even been expressed visually – an incompetent leader, who was hastily replaced by an obviously incompetent successor.
It was under Biden that the Western community, which had long been going through complex internal processes, became “collective” again – the Ukrainian conflict was a catalyst for unity. For Trump, Europe is not part of the “collective West”, but of the “collective Biden”, especially since the European establishment was passionately on his side and throughout the campaign shelled his rival. The Trumps reacted in the same way – they began to interfere in European electoral processes and support parties friendly to them. Only in the post-Soviet space has something like this happened in such a brazen way. Europe is confused and convinces itself that it can do everything without the Americans, but no one knows how to do it. In rhetoric, the Europeans are trying to follow the logic of Steve Walt, but in practice they are doing what Putin described. However, submission to the current Washington is apparently not enough. The US is striving for “regime change” in order to continue cooperating with like-minded individuals. It will probably be they who will “wag their tails”. The above is, of course, a simplified scheme.
The transatlantic conglomerate is a well-built fortress capable of surviving serious blows. However, it has never been attacked with such force, especially from within. The “collective West” could be fatally damaged by the attempt to restore its pillar, the United States. If the restorers succeed, which is by no means guaranteed, Europe will have to adapt. What is happening to some extent refers to the concept of “kulturkampf” – the struggle of the Prussian government against the influence of the Roman Catholic Church after the unification of Germany. Global liberals on both sides of the Atlantic play the role of the papacy, and populists (it is noteworthy that Vance and his associates use this term, which until recently was a curse, in a positive sense) play the role of Bismarck. The European problem is compounded by the fact that the hypothetical refusal to participate in the “West”, as it was formed after the Second World War (before it there was no unified political West), promises a plunge into the unknown. In today’s world, even the largest European countries are individually unable to play a role that they would consider worthy of themselves. And fantasies about a Sino-European rapprochement against the background of the Russian-American entente have nothing to do with reality.
Fyodor Lukyanov already wrote in the pages of the magazine Profil that the main international result of the special military operation was the emergence of a phenomenon that we commonly call the world majority. The large community of countries preferred to distance themselves from the conflict that had erupted; they avoided the urgent demands of the West to join the anti-Russian sanctions coalition and sought to gain advantages for themselves. For the USA, this was an unpleasant surprise and showed that the international environment is now arranged differently. Russia has the opportunity to establish qualitatively different relations with the non-Western part of the world. Now we are witnessing the second consequence of the SVO – within the Western world. And this hypothetically opens up opportunities for Russia as well. We have not observed such ideological unity between Moscow and Washington as there is now for a long time. In the past, when this happened, the common denominator was the American agenda, now it is rather the opposite. Russia and the US are showing mutual courtesy, which is particularly impressive in contrast to their recent mutual bickering. The desire to build on success is understandable, especially since the turn to constructiveness symbolically coincides with the anniversary of the Yalta Conference. But let us maintain a sober approach.
A struggle is taking place within the West that is of fundamental importance for its future. One of the sides (America) considers it useful to involve Russia in it. This rapprochement is also to some extent in Russia’s interests; the main thing is not to get involved in someone else’s confrontation. Here it is appropriate for Russia to take the position of the world majority – we understand your problems, we are ready to cooperate, but within the limits of our possibilities. And not least because historically, involvement in the political and ideological disputes of the West has always been to the detriment of Russia. First of all, it concerns relations with the rest of the world. And the general trend away from long-standing Western dominance will continue, although the trajectory may be quite convoluted. Trump’s intention to reduce relations with allies as much as possible is preparatory work. The main work will begin in the next phase, when the United States engages with larger-caliber rivals, primarily China. In this situation, it will be important for Trump to ensure that Russia does not serve as a factor strengthening Beijing, as he said during the 2016 election campaign. In his first term, things went downhill for domestic American reasons; now Trump’s ability to implement his intentions has improved. The current complete carte blanche is unlikely to last forever, but for now the level of general inability to resist his pressure is impressive.
For historical and cultural reasons, it is more advantageous for Russia to trade with partners in the West than with representatives of other regions. The experience of the past three years has shown how difficult it is to build relations with new partners. On the one hand, the psychology of contacts is different, and on the other hand, the entire global infrastructure is still adapted to the central role of the US and the West, and alternatives are difficult to find. The temptation to turn to the “good old days” is therefore present and understandable. However, we should not succumb to it.
In general, it is not about eternal fluctuations in relations between Russia and the West, nor about the fickleness of electoral fortune. More important is the direction of global transformation. Russia’s return to the path of its usual interaction with the West means consolidating the Cold War scheme. This model locks Russia into US-Western relations, while the rest of the world will increasingly strive for maximum diversification and avoid tied relationships. Most of the world has formed an idea of Russia as an entity that primarily seeks recognition from the West, including through conflict. Accordingly, as soon as Western countries turn to Russia from anger to mercy, it immediately turns its back on everyone else and seeks new relations with the “partners of its dreams.” How fair this assessment is is a separate question, but it is very common. If Moscow really behaves according to this stereotype, it will be almost fatal for its future policy.
The Ukrainian conflict, as I have already written, is not a struggle for the future world order, but the finale (hopefully) of the Cold War, which lasted the entire second half of the twentieth century. A successful military-political and diplomatic end to the conflict will undoubtedly strengthen Russia’s position for the next period. But precisely as a significant and independent participant in the unfolding great and complicated game. Not for world order, but for gaining and using relative advantages for a long period of poorly organized international politics. One in which there will be no “new division of the world”, because it cannot be corrected. Everyone will change in the course of the game. The West, which has entered a period of painful systemic transformation, which, moreover, is not identical in its individual components. Russia, which will have to redefine its goals and expand the range of tools it uses. China, which has reached a level at which it is either necessary to “lock in the gains” or engage in a much riskier game. And so on. Well, I have to repeat the phrase. “In such an environment, it is possible to play the game only if there is a solid rear – a state that is resistant to any stresses and is in harmony with society. Without this, there will be nothing to play for,” added Fyodor Lukyanov.
Erik Simon
