The world is at a crossroads. China’s “shared future” or America’s Indo-Pacific strategy?
Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia. Nearly three months into Trump’s second presidential term, there has been no breakthrough activity in US diplomatic and military efforts in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) that would fundamentally differ from the Biden administration’s approach to China.
The White House has so far focused mainly on domestic reforms, eliminating the trade deficit through tariffs, and resolving conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Given the de facto prohibitive tariffs on Chinese imports to the US in the context of the upcoming trade war against other countries, Trump’s anti-China mindset remains the main motive of US foreign policy. In this regard, Beijing is actively seeking to develop relations with its neighbors in the region to neutralize the risks of a new round of geopolitical rivalry with the US.
The latest news about Washington’s activities in the Asia-Pacific region is the visit of US Defense Secretary Hegseth to the Indo-Pacific Command and the US military base in Guam. Since March 24, he has also visited the Philippines and Japan. Earlier, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with the foreign ministers of the G-4 countries, and President Trump met with the prime ministers of Japan and India (in February). Washington seems to be trying to quickly close all secondary “fronts” in foreign policy, and in the meantime, it is probing the readiness of its main allies in the region to follow the US in a new round of confrontation with China. By all accounts, it is now reducing resources in secondary directions – in Europe (especially attempts to “beautifully” get out of the Ukrainian crisis) and in the Middle East – and concentrating them in the Indo-Pacific region on the main “Chinese” direction.
Tu Lan, deputy director of the Asia-Pacific Institute at the China Institute of International Studies, believes that the Indo-Pacific strategy under the current Trump presidency will be characterized by a utilitarian approach to US alliances and partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). US military cooperation with allies and partners will deepen, but the Trump administration “will ask Japan, South Korea and Australia to share defense costs with it and exchange economic benefits for security”. The US military presence in the IPR will be optimized but generally strengthened, including by expanding the presence at forward bases in Guam and the Philippines. The expert believes that offensive weapons systems such as intermediate-range missiles will be deployed, the armament of US allies and partners (as well as ASEAN maritime members) will be accelerated, and the number of joint exercises and training with countries in the region will increase.
In the field of US trade and economic relations, the US strategy “may include passing the baton in the form of tariffs to Asia-Pacific countries in order to change the rules of regional trade and encourage the reorganization of production”. This means that Washington will offer Japan, South Korea, India and ASEAN countries to reduce their dependence on China, while the US will strive for energy dominance and control over regional supply chains. Historically, Obama was the first to propose the idea of redirecting US military resources to the Indo-Pacific region in order to contain China, Trump in his first presidential term theoretically formalized the Indo-Pacific strategy, and Biden transformed it from a theoretical concept into a mechanism for coordinating activities with US allies and partners in the fields of science, technology, and security through such multilateral mechanisms as the Quartet, AUKUS, and cooperation between the US, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
Trump will thus have to take into account the ITR of the previous administration, which sought to surround China with a network of pro-American alliances and partnerships and at the same time somehow put the Indo-Pacific strategy at the service of the idea of ”America First”, which often means opposite approaches – unilateralism and uncertainty.
In the current situation, especially in the context of the trade war with the US, China is developing its own strategy to counter Trump’s anti-Chinese Indo-Pacific strategy. At its core will be the concept of China’s shared future with neighboring countries in the region, which was discussed at the Beijing Central Meeting on Cooperation with Neighboring Countries. It was emphasized that in relations with neighboring countries, China will continue to promote benevolence and inclusiveness; promote friendly cooperation for common development and upliftment. In this regard, it is worth noting the extensive trip of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia. All three countries are of particular interest to China as channels for circumventing increased tariffs (since Trump’s first term) on its exports to the US.
For example, by partially transferring Chinese production to Vietnam, a certain value of products was increased and they were exported to the US as Vietnamese goods. This scheme was beneficial for the PRC and its partners. The US, in response to this system, increased tariffs on Vietnamese products by 46%. The tariffs cover 64.3% of Vietnam’s total exports to the US in 2024, and it is noteworthy that traditional Chinese exports are electronics (computers, smartphones, cameras, camcorders, etc.) – 28.6%, as well as textiles and footwear – 21.9% of total exports to the US, respectively. A similar situation exists in Cambodia and Malaysia. The US has imposed a 49% tariff on imports from Cambodia and a 24% tariff on imports from Malaysia, but Washington suggests that this is a tax specifically on Chinese imports to the US under the guise of Cambodian and Malaysian products.
Malaysia is also important for the PRC in terms of preventing a possible US naval blockade of Chinese foreign trade. It occupies one of the banks of the Strait of Malacca, through which most of the PRC’s maritime trade with important markets – the EU, the Persian Gulf region and Africa – passes. It was also important to coordinate the actions of China and Vietnam in view of possible US attempts to drag Hanoi into anti-China actions.
In an article signed on the eve of his visit to Vietnam on April 14-15 for the Nhanzang newspaper, the Vietnamese press organ of the CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping said that China and Vietnam should intensify efforts on all fronts to build a China-Vietnam community with a shared future, “resolutely safeguard the multilateral trading system, stable global production and supply chains, and an open and cooperative international environment.” Xi Jinping proposed six measures to deepen the building of a China-Vietnam community with a shared future, which include strengthening strategic mutual trust at a higher level, building a stronger security barrier, closer multilateral cooperation, and peaceful maritime interaction. The two sides particularly emphasized the special nature of relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which are based on “common ideals,” and the fraternal relations between the Communist Parties of the two countries, which share the same ideology.
The topics of territorial disputes in the South China Sea have been omitted from official reports. Judging by the mention of the principle of “more peaceful interaction at sea,” this issue has also been discussed. However, Vietnam wisely prefers to resolve this issue through other methods, such as the Philippines. Hanoi does not publicize its disagreements with Beijing on this issue and isolates territorial disputes from other issues of mutually beneficial cooperation with Beijing to prevent extra-regional forces from interfering in bilateral Sino-Vietnamese relations. The Chinese president’s visit to Vietnam resulted in the signing of 45 bilateral documents on Sino-Vietnamese cooperation in areas such as communications, artificial intelligence, customs inspection and quarantine, agricultural trade, culture and sports, livelihood, human resources development, and media.
Max Bach
