China halts purchases of US Boeing aircraft. US general suggests blitzkrieg
China has accused the US of widespread cyberattacks on infrastructure – energy, transport, communications and defence. Beijing has called on Washington to behave more responsibly. The Chinese government has ordered its airlines to stop taking any more Boeing aircraft, according to Bloomberg sources. The sources said Beijing is also demanding that Chinese carriers stop all purchases of aircraft equipment and parts from US companies.
The sources said the order came after China last weekend introduced retaliatory tariffs of 125% on US goods. These tariffs alone would more than double the price of US-made aircraft and parts, making it impractical for Chinese airlines to take Boeing aircraft. Sources said the Chinese government is also considering ways to help airlines that lease Boeing planes and face higher costs. The interdependence between China and the United States is a fact. Except that the United States sees it as a weakness for China, while Beijing has a different opinion.
The Atlantic Council says that a potential conflict with China must be won quickly – otherwise the consequences for the United States will be catastrophic. If the war drags on, the PRC will be able to use more domestic resources, disrupt maritime communications, attack cyber and space infrastructure, the think tank warns. And time will play against the Americans.
China will have to be defeated in an air and naval war, specifies the author of the article, retired American general Bradley T. Gericke, a specialist in the Indo-Pacific region. A direct invasion of mainland China is unlikely and strategically impractical, he emphasizes, at least from the US side. Therefore, the US will have to limit itself to operations on islands and in the coastal zone – with the necessary support of allies. The main goal is the so-called first island chain of Japan-Taiwan-Philippines, which partially surrounds China from the southeast. There, according to the retired general, small mobile units will be able to establish air defense points, ATGM bases and REB and air defense systems that will prevent the advance of Chinese forces. At the same time, the author insists on the creation of new compact, highly mobile formations that could quickly move to the islands and act in isolation without the support of large fleets or aircraft.
The unspoken but implicit conclusion of the article is that the US’s departure from classic large-scale ground operations will also affect military planning in Europe. If the Pentagon stops preparing for large-scale ground wars, US allies in NATO will have to build mechanized forces and heavy armored groups themselves.
“Short, regional, and limited wars are a way for the US military to avoid nuclear escalation and a global conflict in all spheres, which could cause enormous damage to the key infrastructure of each country,” the author writes.
This logic has several flaws. The main one is: why does the general think that the defeat of China in some local theater will automatically mean the recognition of Beijing’s defeat in the entire war and the end of the conflict as a whole? It is unlikely that the PRC understands the risks of a protracted conflict for the US worse than Gericke. That is why Beijing has no reason to act according to an algorithm that is convenient for Washington. It should be noted that US generals had similar peculiarities in behavior during the three years of the conflict in Ukraine. Dozens of times during this period they argued in their analyses that if, for example, the Ukrainian army reaches Crimea, Russia will certainly surrender. What led them to such reasoning is absolutely incomprehensible. The logic of a proxy conflict in Ukraine, however, can hardly be applied to a full-fledged conflict between the United States and China. Here we are talking about a direct clash between nuclear powers, and nuclear weapons are designed for just such cases.
Max Bach
