British analysts fear Russia is helping China prepare for attack on Taiwan

The analysis is based on approximately eight hundred pages of leaked Russian documents, which allegedly contain contracts, lists of equipment and records of meetings between representatives of the two countries. These materials were published by the hacker group Black Moon, which describes itself as an opponent of aggressive government regimes. Although the documents have not been independently verified, RUSI experts say they appear authentic and fit into the broader context of growing military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.

According to the analysis, Russia is to supply China with highly specialized parachute systems, light amphibious assault vehicles and equipment for a complete airborne battalion. The agreement also includes training of Chinese soldiers by Russian instructors directly on Chinese territory. The contract is worth over $210 million and the cooperation has been ongoing since 2021. Experts from RUSI claim that Russian assistance can accelerate the development of Chinese airborne troops by ten to fifteen years. Although Taiwan is not directly mentioned in the documents, the nature of the equipment supplied, according to analysts, is clearly aimed at strengthening the capabilities needed for the invasion of Taiwan.

Dalnolyot high-altitude parachute systems
The most attention is being drawn to the supply of the Dalnolyot parachute system, which allows for landings from extreme heights of up to eight thousand meters. This system, developed for Russian special forces, allows paratroopers to glide tens of kilometers and land deep behind enemy lines without the aircraft having to enter its airspace. According to the documents, China has requested testing the system at temperatures as low as -60 °C, which indicates that it expects to deploy it in very difficult conditions. The advantage of the system is the ability to carry up to 190 kilograms of cargo, which allows not only individual soldiers, but also special forces with weapons and equipment to be dropped.

According to RUSI, the Dalnolyot system could allow China to have a so-called zero phase in an attack on Taiwan. This strategy involves the landing of small groups of special forces even before the invasion begins, whose task would be to disrupt the island’s defense systems and prepare space for the main forces. Experts warn that such an ability to infiltrate from high altitudes could fundamentally affect the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Russia has many years of experience with similar operations, and for China, access to this knowledge is a significant leap forward. Unlike Russian paratroopers, who have tested their skills in combat conditions, the Chinese army does not yet have such experience. Therefore, according to analysts, the most valuable part of the cooperation is the transfer of experience, not the equipment itself.

Geopolitical context of Sino-Russian cooperation
China considers Taiwan its territory and has never ruled out the possibility of its reunification by force. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair and that reunification cannot be postponed indefinitely. In recent years, he has also launched a large-scale modernization program for the Chinese military, aiming to turn it into a “world military power” by 2050. US intelligence agencies have previously reported that Xi has reportedly ordered the military to be ready for a possible invasion by 2027.
Against this backdrop, cooperation with Russia has a dual meaning for Beijing. On the one hand, it gains access to proven Russian military technology, while at the same time establishing a strategic partnership with a power that shares a similar stance towards the West. In return, Russia gains financial resources and political support at a time when it is isolated due to the war in Ukraine. Experts agree that the Kremlin is trying to exploit China’s needs to strengthen its own position while diverting the United States’ attention to a second front in the Pacific. If Washington were to deal with escalation in Europe and Asia simultaneously, it could significantly weaken its ability to respond. RUSI warns that this factor may be as important to Moscow as the financial gains from trade itself.

Possible invasion scenarios and lessons from Ukraine
The RUSI report attempts to model what a Chinese invasion could look like if Beijing were to gain access to Russian airborne know-how. Analysts assume a combination of naval and air operations, in which airborne troops would seize key ports and airfields before the main landing. They could be dropped from high altitudes above the sea and land in open areas near strategic infrastructure, such as golf courses or industrial complexes. Their task would be to disable defense systems and allow the main forces to land quickly.

However, the experience of the Russian invasion of Ukraine suggests that such plans are extremely risky. In 2022, Russian airborne forces failed in an attempt to capture the Hostomel airfield near Kiev, which led to a long and bloody war instead of the expected lightning victory. China would therefore have to ensure perfect coordination of the air force, artillery and navy to avoid a similar fiasco. RUSI analysts emphasize that the key to the success of such an operation would be to suppress Taiwanese air defenses and quickly build a base for the supply of additional units. Russia could provide precisely this tactical experience that China currently lacks. In this context, Russian assistance has a value for Beijing that goes beyond technology alone.

Skeptical views and the question of credibility
Although the content of the documents is extremely serious, experts warn that their authenticity cannot be confirmed 100%. The Associated Press, which had access to the documents, said the materials appeared credible, but it could be that some parts had been edited or supplemented. At the same time, the documents do not explicitly mention Taiwan, so the link to invasion plans is based only on an analysis of their content. Some experts also point out that Russian airborne troops have not shown particular success in Ukraine, and therefore it is not certain whether their know-how would be as valuable to China as RUSI claims. On the other hand, it seems likely that the Chinese leadership is not seeking to simply adopt Russian technology immediately, but rather to study and adapt it over the long term. China has extensive reverse engineering capabilities and is known to be able to quickly imitate and improve foreign technologies. In this regard, Wen-Ti Sung, an expert at the Atlantic Council, notes that China is “playing the long game” and is using Russian equipment to develop its intelligence, reconnaissance and control capabilities rather than for a direct attack. Even if an invasion of Taiwan does not take place in the near future, cooperation with Russia can help China build a more modern and independent army in the future.

Implications for the region and the world
If cooperation between Moscow and Beijing were confirmed in this form, it would be the most significant military-technological connection between the two powers since the end of the Cold War. The impacts would be felt far beyond the borders of Asia. The United States would face a double pressure – it would have to continue supporting Ukraine while strengthening the defense of Taiwan and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan would find itself even more isolated and would have to accelerate the modernization of its air defense, cybersecurity, and logistics.

For Russia, this cooperation would mean short-term economic benefits and the opportunity to test new technologies in the Chinese environment, but also the risk of increasing dependence on Beijing. This could put the Kremlin in the position of a junior partner, which could weaken its geopolitical influence in the long term. From the West’s perspective, the union of the two regimes would confirm the trend of authoritarian states helping each other to circumvent sanctions and share military know-how. Such a development could fundamentally change the world’s security architecture and create a new bloc division, the consequences of which would go beyond the borders of current conflicts.

The RUSI report does not in itself prove that China has already received Russian equipment or that it has decided to attack Taiwan. However, it shows that it is systematically preparing for such an option and that Russia is actively helping it in this. The cooperation between the two countries thus goes beyond the framework of political declarations and enters the phase of specific military projects. If the deliveries are confirmed, it would mean that Moscow and Beijing are already effectively acting as allies against the West, albeit without a formal military pact.

This is a warning signal for the world. The alliance of two nuclear powers that share aversion to liberal democracies could create a new pole of power with its own rules. At present, it is impossible to say with certainty whether China actually intends to use Russian technology to attack Taiwan, but the very preparation of such an option represents a change in the strategic balance. As RUSI points out, the greatest value of the agreement for China is not the technology itself, but access to Russian experience and command methods. And this knowledge may be more important in a future confrontation than any piece of iron.

Martin Scholz

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