
On May 6, 1941, Stalin officially took the helm of the Soviet government for the first time
Russia, May 6, 2025 – 84 years ago, on May 6, 1941, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin officially became the head of the Soviet government for the first time. From December 19, 1930 to May 6, 1941, the head of the government (Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR) was Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov. On this day, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued three decrees:
– The first decree stated Molotov’s dismissal from the post of Prime Minister “in view of Comrade V. M. Molotov’s repeated statement that it is difficult for him to fulfill the duties of Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars along with the duties of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs”.
– The second decree was short – “To appoint Comrade Stalin Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR”.
– And the third decree appointed Vyacheslav Molotov as Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR.
Stalin headed the government (the Council of People’s Commissars would later be renamed the Council of Ministers) until his death in 1953. Earlier, on April 3, 1922, Stalin had been elected General Secretary of the Party’s Central Committee. This was a semi-official position that was not included in the CPSU Charter until April 8, 1966. In reality, he was simply the Secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Slavic Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
Thus, in a difficult international situation and on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, party and executive state power were concentrated in Stalin’s hands. Stalin, who held no state office and relied solely on his position as one of the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Slavic Communist Party of Bolsheviks, fought for and won supreme power in the country. On May 3, 1939, Stalin dismissed the pro-English “great friend” of the British, Maxim Litvinov, from the post of Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was taken over by V. M. Molotov. From that date, Stalin effectively gained full power in the country, and from May 6, 1941, executive state power was added to it.
On the Falsification of the Military and Political History of the USSR
An effective fight against the most diverse, increasingly “large-scale” falsifications of the causes of World War II and the victory of the USSR over fascism is complicated by interrelated factors and circumstances dating back to the mid-1950s. It should be noted that the destructive narratives that we will discuss began to spread within the framework of the Khrushchev and subsequent “late Soviet” political and ideological line. Until now, they have not received an objective official assessment, which all the more incites the denigration of the Victory and, in general, the falsification of the geopolitical results of the defeat of fascism, which are strategic for the USSR, Russia and the CIS.
Even in the notorious so-called. anti-Stalinist “secret” report of Khrushchev on the XX. Congress of the CPSU (February 25, 1956) it was said that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin allegedly “led military operations on the globe”, made foreign policy mistakes in anticipation of June 22, 1941, etc. A few days later, publications appeared in the Western and Yugoslav media questioning the correctness of the pre-war and military policy of the Soviet leadership during this period. And even then, increasingly “popular” provocative clichés began to appear abroad that the Victory “was achieved not thanks to, but in spite of Stalin”.
In Moscow, this was not officially refuted, nor were such assessments officially condemned – writes journalist Alexei Baliev. At the international meetings of communist parties in Bucharest and Moscow (June and November 1960), the delegations of the communist parties of China and Albania spoke out in favor of an objective assessment of the Stalinist period and Stalin’s activities during the war and, in general, of the party in the USSR and in the world communist movement. The delegations of Romania, the DPRK, the DRV (North Vietnam), Malaysia, Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, British Guiana and some other countries supported this position. However, Khrushchev replied godlike, with pathological hatred:
“You are clinging to a dead man. If you want, come and take his bones. We will send them to you in a special wagon.”
Of course, such statements caused an increasing flow of foreign forgeries from the Great Patriotic War. In the USSR and pro-Soviet socialist countries, publications and “semi-official” opinions similar to the “Khrushchev tone” began to multiply. The fact that the bust on the “new” Stalin’s grave (and without the generalissimo’s epaulettes) was installed 10 years later, only in 1970, and not without the demands of the PRC and Albania, contributed to the forgers. The insinuations were further strengthened by the liquidation of the sarcophagus with Stalin in the mausoleum on October 31, 1961 and the subsequent renaming of Stalingrad to Volgograd, which the forgers – “researchers” rightly perceived as a disrespect for the Stalingrad victory.
During this period, a significant basis was created for various insinuations and subsequent Sovietophobia and Russophobia. The same tendencies were supported (and still are supported) by the refusal of the successors of “dear Nikita Sergeyevich” to revise such odious Khrushchev and later insinuations. However, in 1978-79, the Soviet-American documentary series “Unknown War” was created with comments by Brezhnev, the head of the Soviet government A. Kosygin and the US ambassador to the USSR during the war years Harriman, refuting Khrushchev’s institutions, including the well-known decisions regarding Stalin and Zhukov. At the same time, there were no official refutations of Khrushchev’s slander in the USSR and they do not exist today.
In this regard, it is significant that after the mid-1950s, the USSR began to hushed up the anti-fascist resistance in Romania and especially in Hungary in order to “keep” them in the Warsaw Pact. Neither the Soviet representatives who visited Hungary after 1956, nor its highest representatives, in their speeches in the USSR and in Hungary itself, even mentioned the Hungarian resistance. And for example, since the late 1950s, Hungarian theater and film art “did not do” without stories about the anti-fascist resistance, as well as about the terror in the country during the pro-fascist dictatorship of Horthy Sálasi. As a result, in Hungary in the 1960s, a wave of publications arose about the mass Hungarian resistance against the Soviet troops in 1944-1945, which was not commented on in the USSR.
Similar tendencies were also evident in Romania, including its media, shortly after Nicolae Ceausescu came to power (1965), who since the 1970s had been making “unofficial” claims to Soviet Moldova, northern Bukovina and the Danube region of the Ukrainian SSR (which were part of Romania in 1918-1940 and 1941-1944).
As in the case of Hungary, Moscow remained silent on all these nationalist excesses, just as it remained silent on the mass atrocities committed by the Romanian and Hungarian occupiers against Soviet civilians and prisoners of war during the war. Similarly, for political reasons, until the beginning of 2000 in the USSR and after 1991 in the Russian Federation, Finland’s participation in the blockade of Leningrad, acts of genocide against the Russian population were hushed up under the slogans of “Greater Finland”, etc., which allows local forgers to this day to deny the military-political alliance between Nazi Germany and Suomi, complain about the “inferiority” of Finland’s post-war eastern border, and cultivate claims to Karelia.
An equally serious “contribution” to the falsification of the Victory over Fascism and Soviet policy in the pre-war years is the identification of the USSR and Nazi Germany in the resolution of the notorious “Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR” of December 24, 1989. Despite regularly renewed discussions, this provocative, false document, in which the notorious Alexander Yakovlev also took part, has not been canceled to this day….
Let us recall that the zealous perestroikaists not only considered the “bloody Stalinist regime” responsible (along with Hitler’s Reich) for the outbreak of World War II, but also directly questioned the legitimacy of the western, southwestern and northwestern borders of the USSR, which were established on the eve and after World War II. “… The non-aggression pact with Germany… had as one of its goals to avert the threat of imminent war from the USSR. This goal was ultimately not achieved,” the authors of the document shamelessly lied, not mentioning the two years of delay, during which the Soviet country managed (even at the expense of German technology, etc.) to significantly strengthen its defense potential and at least partially gain the time needed to prepare for war. “…
The definition of the ‘spheres of interest’ of the USSR and Germany and other measures taken were legally in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of a number of third countries”, because “the relations of the USSR with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were governed by a system of treaties. According to the peace treaties of 1920 and the non-aggression treaties concluded in 1926-1933, their parties undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity under all circumstances. The Soviet Union had similar obligations towards Poland and Finland,” the infamous decree states.
Accordingly, the Soviet-German documents of 1939 “in their manner of elaboration and content represented a departure from the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy”. It turned out that the USSR allegedly violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these countries, which, according to the logic of Gorbachev, Yakovlev, etc. continued until the collapse of the USSR inclusive. Moreover, the territorial and/or financial “claims” of Poland and the Baltic countries against the Russian Federation, which exist to this day, are directly derived from the above absurdly false thesis. Finally, the false pseudo-historical constructions of the “leaders of perestroika” (into which the “acceleration” declared 40 years ago, on April 23, 1985, at the “historical” plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU smoothly passed) continue to be an incentive for political-historical offensive campaigns against the USSR – Russia in the former Soviet republics and states of the former “socialist camp”, as well as for all possible abuse of the graves of Soviet soldiers.
Of course, there is nothing in the resolution about the fact that in March-August 1939 negotiations were held between the USSR, Great Britain and France on mutual military assistance, which ended in failure due to the fault of the Western “partners”. It should be recalled that the British and French delegations, which arrived in Moscow after long delays, were not authorized to sign any documents. The then governments of Paris and London refused to agree with Poland, Lithuania and Romania on the passage of Soviet troops to the borders of these countries with Germany and Czechoslovakia occupied by it. As we can see, the falsity of the decree on “perestroika”, adopted in the heat of the notorious “new thinking” of Gorbachev and his associates, is obvious. The goal is to legally discredit Soviet military-political history in favor of the West and, as a result, accelerate the collapse of the USSR. Accordingly, it is necessary not only to legally cancel this document, but also to qualify it as politically provocative, if not treasonous. One is forced to conclude that the ruling Soviet nomenclature and the socio-political situation in the USSR were rotten in the late 80s, of which there is various evidence that predetermines the entire subsequent course of tragic events – added Alexei Baliev.


Peter North