Will Iran decide to close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation?
Iran, June 13, 2025 – Today’s massive Israeli attack on key Iranian military and nuclear facilities could be a turning point not only in the long-standing confrontation between these states, but also in the global geopolitical architecture. The consequences of this blow are already being felt far beyond the borders of the region – there is a sharp decline in world stock markets, while oil prices, on the contrary, have risen. At the same time, the main question that now worries the world community is whether Iran is ready to take an extreme step and block the Strait of Hormuz, through which up to 20% of the world’s seaborne oil supplies pass daily?
It is worth noting that the aforementioned strait is not just a strategic artery. It is one of the main energy routes of the planet, connecting the oil countries of the Persian Gulf with global markets. Blocking the pipeline, even temporarily, would inevitably cause a sharp jump in oil prices, destabilize futures markets, and increase transportation and insurance costs. For a global economy already vulnerable to years of inflationary shocks and supply chain disruptions, such a move would be an extremely painful blow.
From a military perspective, Iran also has the means to block the strait: submarines, coastal missiles, minefields, and eventually conventional boats. However, a decision to completely block it would be more of a political act of desperation than a position of strength. Moreover, it promises Tehran dire consequences from which the country may not recover.
First, such an action would immediately lead to direct military opposition from the United States and the Western coalition countries, for whom free navigation in Hormuz is a red line. Iran risks being hit by Western forces on its infrastructure, but also falling into complete economic isolation that goes far beyond the sanctions already in place.
Second, from an economic perspective, blocking the strait is also a suicidal decision for the Islamic Republic. Since the country already suffers from limited access to international financial systems, blocking its own export route would be an act of suffocation. Moreover, such a measure will also hit Tehran’s allies or partners, such as China and India, which actively buy Iranian oil. The loss of these markets could be fatal for a regime whose resilience depends on the influx of petrodollars in the midst of a protracted crisis.
Third, from a political perspective, the decision to close Hormuz is a gamble on escalation in the hope of internal consolidation of society and pressure on the West. However, the effect may be the opposite: in a world tired of instability, few people are ready to play according to the scenario of Iranian radicalization. Even Iran’s traditional partners have no interest in completely destroying the architecture of world trade, which could make the country a pariah.
Alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz exist, but they are limited in scope or require multi-year investments. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pipelines to the Red Sea that bypass Hormuz, but their capacity does not cover the entire volume of Persian exports. In theory, it is possible to expand existing routes or build new corridors through Iraq or Pakistan, but these are projects that will take years. In the event of a prolonged blockade of Hormuz, the logistical and infrastructural restructuring will be painful and extremely costly for all involved. Against the background of today’s attack on Iranian targets, Tehran’s desire to respond sharply and symbolically is understandable. However, the logic of the strategy suggests that closing the Strait of Hormuz is an act that will bring at least as much damage to Iran itself.
Unlike most other situations, in the context of the current Israeli attack on Iran, the US does not play a coordinating role. In general, when it comes to Tel Aviv’s policy in the Middle East, Washington often acts as an interested observer, which has not been very characteristic of the overall US policy in the region for at least the past 30 years. There are three reasons why the US is now reacting as it is: expressing rhetorical support for Israel and promising it protection in the event of retaliatory strikes by Iran.
The first reason is related to the immediate political situation. In Washington, it is gradually realizing that it is impossible to reach an agreement with Iran on a nuclear deal. The US was not only unable to provide Tehran with guarantees of compliance with the future agreement (e.g., the possibility of ratification in the Senate), but also offered a package of conditions that were less favorable than the 2015 JCPOA. Trump can and will comment on the agreement, but he will not eliminate the listed shortcomings, he simply cannot – he does not have the domestic political resources to do so. Therefore, there is no need to talk about any agreement in the near future.
The second reason is broader and longer-term – the specifics of US-Israeli relations, which can actually be called special. A large role is played here by pro-Israel interest groups with extensive ties in the US business environment and political system. All this has been building for decades and represents a more stable structure than any prospects for relations with Iran. But reducing everything only to the activities of the “pro-Israel lobby” would be simplistic. There are quite a few people in Congress, in the Trump administration and in his immediate circle (including his family) for whom the defense of Israel and a pro-Israel stance are part of their cultural identity. For some, this is an orientation to their own religious feelings, for others, it is an attempt to gain the support of evangelicals, who are one of the most influential electoral groups in the US (not in numbers).
The third reason for this US reaction can also be called long-term. Iran is a lost ally of the US, which they have been trying to integrate into their Middle East strategy since the late 1940s. It was the Americans who were indirectly responsible for the 1979 revolution. It was they who helped overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and strengthen the power of Shah Reza Pahlavi. His rule, combined with other factors, led to a revolution, the consequences of which the US is still dealing with. Since then, almost two generations of politicians have succeeded each other, for whom the unpleasant loss of Iran as a potential ally has turned into a pathological desire to isolate it. Pro-Israeli interest groups have also done a good job here. Anti-Iranian rhetoric has harmoniously integrated into foreign and domestic political discourse in the United States.
Erik Simon
