Sharing aircraft, not hangar keys: The US-Europe maintenance paradox within NATO
Transatlantic defense cooperation between the United States and Europe is based on the decades-old idea of interoperable forces—armies that can operate, communicate, and fight side by side. On paper, this interoperability has become a symbol of NATO’s success. In practice, however, it faces a remarkable paradox: the United States and European countries often fly the same aircraft, notably the F-16 and F-35, but they are unable to maintain and repair each other’s aircraft.
This means that a Norwegian mechanic cannot repair an American F-35 without special permission, and an American technician cannot repair a Dutch aircraft of the same type. This problem does not seem to be a marginal technical issue. It is a structural weakness in the alliance that threatens NATO’s ability to respond quickly and flexibly in crisis situations. As a recent study by the RAND Corporation think tank concluded, “the lack of cross-servicing capabilities among allies remains one of the greatest practical obstacles to NATO interoperability.”
The legacy of incompatibility
The roots of the current inefficiency go deep into the history of transatlantic relations. After the end of the Cold War, most European states abolished their own capabilities for the development and production of combat aircraft and switched to purchasing American platforms under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. While this gave Europe access to modern technology, it also locked itself into a system of American export control rules and licensing restrictions, known as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Today, European air forces are structurally dependent on American know-how and on supplies of spare parts from the United States. While this model guarantees compatibility of equipment, it also paradoxically prevents the true autonomy and flexibility of European allies. Once an aircraft is embedded in the American system of maintenance and software updates, even a seemingly trivial intervention cannot be carried out without Washington’s permission. From a bureaucratic perspective, it is about protecting sensitive technologies. From a military practice perspective, however, it is a systemic risk: an alliance that declares common defense is dependent on a single partner for logistics.
Bureaucratic and technical obstacles: Interoperability only on paper
The reasons for the inability to perform mutual maintenance are complex. The RAND study and other sources identify several layers of problems: Technical fragmentation – even “the same” aircraft types, such as the F-16, exist in dozens of variants with different software, avionics, and design specifics. Licensing restrictions – ITAR and other US laws prohibit sharing parts of technical documentation and software between foreign users without explicit permission. Certification chaos – European and US maintenance standards are not fully compatible. Each country has its own qualification frameworks for technicians, spare parts, and testing procedures. Outdated alliance agreements – NATO Technical Arrangements and Cross-Servicing Agreements – are often decades old and do not reflect the reality of modern platforms, especially the F-35 stealth aircraft.
This tangle of legal, technical and institutional barriers means that even within joint missions, allies cannot share logistical capabilities. As Defense News described it with a certain amount of irony, “the alliance flies the same aircraft, but everyone has to carry their own screwdriver”.
Operational consequences: the alliance’s logistical Achilles’ heel
The consequences are not limited to the convenience of air units – they have a direct impact on NATO’s operational readiness. During exercises or missions, each country must provide its own technical teams and equipment, even if it operates from the same airfield as allies. When moving according to the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) principle, this means duplicate logistics, a greater burden on supply chains and less flexibility of deployment.
An analysis published in the OTH Journal shows that the ability to quickly move aircraft around Europe is limited precisely by the inability to use partners’ facilities. In practice, this means that aircraft must be transported with “their” teams and equipment, which contradicts the very principle of alliance readiness. This situation would be understandable in the case of incompatible systems – but in the case of the F-35, which represents the same platform, it seems like an institutional absurdity.
The European perspective: between dependence and self-sufficiency
European states are beginning to realize that true defense autonomy does not consist only in purchasing American weapons, but in building their own infrastructure for maintenance and servicing. Europe invests billions of euros in the purchase of modern aircraft, but only a fraction of these funds are directed towards their long-term sustainability.
Some initiatives – such as the FCAS projects (France, Germany, Spain) or Tempest (UK, Italy, Sweden) – have the ambition to create a European service architecture that would reduce dependence on the US. However, the problem remains the fragmentation of standards and the lack of uniformity of political priorities. Europe thus finds itself between two poles: on the one hand, strategic autonomy, on the other, practical dependence.
Possible paths to remedy
To eliminate the paradox of shared but non-integrated maintenance, several steps would need to be taken at NATO, US and EU level: Harmonization of maintenance certifications and standards – creation of an alliance framework similar to the civil EASA agency, which would recognize the qualifications and certifications of technicians across states. Reform of ITAR and US export regulations – negotiation of exemptions for NATO allies, allowing the sharing of technical documentation and service know-how without a lengthy licensing process. The establishment of joint maintenance hubs in Europe – selected bases could serve as multinational service centers for the F-35 and other platforms. Joint logistics education and training – standardizing training of technical personnel and exchanging experiences. Incorporating maintenance interoperability into the NATO Defense Planning Process – so that logistics does not become an afterthought after the acquisition of equipment. These steps would not only increase efficiency, but also send a clear political signal that the alliance takes its commitment to acting together seriously.
Shared values require shared screwdrivers
The inability to maintain each other’s aircraft of the same type is more than just a bureaucratic detail – it is a symptom of a broader problem where the alliance declares unity but maintains separate systems. If NATO cannot create the conditions for joint logistics, it will be difficult to convincingly claim that it is ready for truly integrated operations. Europe and the United States must decide whether they want an alliance that shares only symbols or an alliance that shares tools. Because until allies are able to repair each other’s aircraft, the term “interoperability” will remain just a good-sounding slogan.
Martin Scholz
