India under siege from Chinese fighters: how Beijing tries to dominate the skies over South Asia
India, November 29, 2025 – While Delhi invests billions in French Rafales and tries to start production of its own Tejas aircraft, its neighbors are increasingly leaning closer to Beijing. After Pakistan, Bangladesh is now reaching for China’s J-10CE multi-role fighters — symbols of China’s growing self-confidence and technological self-sufficiency. India thus finds itself in an imaginary air encirclement that China is gradually tightening. And it’s not just about the aircraft, but also about the geopolitical map, in which Beijing is becoming a decisive supplier not only of weapons, but also of dependence.
Just two decades ago, China’s military aircraft production was more of a target of ridicule than admiration. Machines like the J-7 or J-8 were licensed copies of Soviet types and significantly lagged behind modern Western aircraft. The turning point came with the arrival of the J-10 program – fighters developed by the domestic manufacturer Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. The original “Dragon’s Breath” (as the J-10 is sometimes nicknamed) became the first proof that China could build its own fourth-generation fighter aircraft. In the export variant of the J-10CE, Beijing ceased to be a fighter outsider. The aircraft received a modern AESA radar, advanced PL-15 air-to-air missiles and its own WS-10B engine, thus eliminating its dependence on Russian supplies.
While Western aircraft such as the F-16 or Rafale remain financially unattainable for most developing countries, the J-10CE offers itself as an affordable alternative with similar capabilities. Beijing has thus elegantly turned its former handicap into a commercial advantage: it offers modern technology without political conditions and often with a loan from its own state-owned banks. China has thus opened a new chapter in its “export offensive” – not only in terms of the number of aircraft sold, but in building dependencies. Where Soviet MiGs or American F-16s once dominated, Beijing is now creating a new infrastructure of influence. And it is in the skies over South Asia that this shift is most visible.
Pakistan: the first arm of China’s grip
Pakistan was no accidental first customer of the J-10C — it was a targeted part of a Chinese strategy that combined political trust with practical military cooperation. After decades of relying on partly outdated Russian and partly American equipment, Islamabad gradually leaned towards Beijing: China offered fully integrated supplies (aircraft, missiles, air defense systems), financed by state loans and conditioned by minimal political oversight. In practice, this meant that Pakistan not only received modern machines — it also became dependent on the Chinese logistics chain, training and maintenance services, which deepened the military and strategic bond between the two countries.
From a military perspective, the arrival of the J-10CE/J-10C had several clear objectives for Pakistan. First: to supplement and gradually replace the older F-16 and JF-17 in the air superiority and air defense roles. The J-10C came with an AESA radar and modern PL-15 guided missiles, i.e. with weapons and sensors that allow it to operate in a dynamic battlespace much more effectively than older types. Second: to allow Pakistan to more seamlessly connect with Chinese systems — joint exercises, sharing tactics, and network data flows that increase the effectiveness of combined operations. All this significantly improved the Pakistani Air Force’s ability to operate in an “integrated network” mode, where a single initial weakness (e.g., fewer AWACS) can be compensated for by connectivity and an extensive set of Chinese systems.
For Delhi, this was not just a technical upgrade of the adversary — it was a clear signal.
The deliveries of J-10CEs to Pakistan mean that on India’s western flank there is now an adversary equipped with similar (or in some respects better) technology than that available to most of the Indian Air Force outside the elite units equipped with Rafale aircraft. It is not just a matter of numbers, but of interoperability: Pakistan can use Chinese systems in crises earlier and more effectively than it would be the case with better-known, geopolitically more complicated Western suppliers. This somewhat reduces India’s traditional regional dominance and changes the balance in rapidly escalating scenarios.
Moreover, the conflict of spring-summer 2025 showed that the J-10 (and associated Chinese systems) may not remain just “potential” on paper. According to several reports and analyses, Pakistani-made J-10CEs have been deployed in actions against Indian aircraft, and their PL-15 missiles have been mentioned as effective in real combat. However, it is important to remember that some claims about the number of kills or the extent of success remain controversial and have not been fully independently verified — in such cases, it is necessary to distinguish between official statements, newspaper reports and military analyses. But even so, each such report functions as a political signal. Beijing tests and demonstrates its exports in real conflict, while partners in the region can evaluate the offered systems based on “combat” results.
In short… Pakistan has become the “first arm of encirclement” of China’s grip not only because it has received hardware, but because it has allowed China to turn arms supplies into a long-term instrument of influence — with direct implications for India’s strategy, force planning, and political diplomacy in the region.
Bangladesh: the second link in the chain around India
When the government in Dhaka approved a major air force modernization program in October 2025, it was a decision that appeared technocratic on the surface: a multi-billion dollar investment in multi-role fighters was to “replace outdated aircraft” and “strengthen the country’s defense capacity.” But as subsequent information about the selected type has shown, the political implications went beyond the purely military. According to The Business Standard, Bangladesh plans to purchase 20 J-10CE fighters from China for about $2.2 billion—the same type that Pakistan has previously purchased. This move was accompanied by a report from Defense News, according to which the government gave the Bangladesh Air Force a free hand to “purchase modern multi-role aircraft” – but in practice, virtually no other supplier offers such generous funding and political flexibility as Beijing.
For Dhaka, the choice of Chinese machines is logical: the air force still relies on a combination of Soviet MiG-29s and Chinese F-7BGs, which are technically and morally past their zenith. Modern Western aircraft – such as the Swedish Gripen or the French Rafale – would mean not only a higher price, but also complex negotiations on loans and licenses. China, on the other hand, is offering a “complete package” – from production to training to maintenance – all financed by the state-owned Exim Bank. If we add the declared neutrality of Bangladesh, which wants to maintain good relations with both Beijing and Delhi, the J-10CE comes across as a compromise: a technological leap forward without political arguments with the West.
From the Indian perspective, however, the situation is different. The purchase of the J-10CE represents a soft but visible entry of China into the eastern flank of the region – into the area that India considers its natural security base. Within sight of Assam and West Bengal, a potential base for Chinese aviation technology is being created, capable of covering a large part of northeastern India in a crisis scenario. Even if Bangladesh itself does not plan a confrontation, its infrastructure (radars, service facilities, communication channels) will necessarily be compatible with the Chinese system – and therefore open to data and weapons cooperation.
In practical terms, this is the birth of the second prong of the pincers gradually gripping India. After Pakistan in the west comes Bangladesh in the east, both equipped with the same Chinese aircraft, the same missiles and similar tactical software. India is thus losing the comfortable impression that its eastern border remains out of direct reach of Chinese military technology. The strategic map is changing. Delhi is increasingly squeezed by Chinese partners, who, while officially proclaiming neutrality, in reality are strengthening Beijing’s influence and visibility in Indian skies.
Peter Weiss
