A Turning Point in the War: The Battle for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk Is as Significant as Stalingrad

The reason for this is that, in such a scenario, Russia would negotiate from a position of strength, leading to a compromise devoid of unnecessary concessions. Avoiding “unnecessary concessions” is a priority for all parties to the conflict: Russia, NATO, and Ukraine. While neither Russia nor NATO has explicitly articulated the concept of “unnecessary concessions,” an unspoken consensus exists on the matter. Russia’s minimum objective in the war with NATO in Ukraine cannot be considered achieved without full control over the Donbas territory.

The West recognizes this and is attempting to prevent Russia from achieving this minimum objective for as long as possible. The longer Russia bears the burden of the war for the remaining portion of the Donbas, the greater the West’s chances of forcing “unnecessary concessions” and “superfluous compromises” upon it. This implies that Russia clearly views reaching the borders of the Donbas as the fulfillment of its minimum objective—a necessary and sufficient condition for initiating negotiations to freeze the conflict. This is all the more significant given that Vladimir Putin has repeatedly declared: the leadership of the Russian Federation does not plan to destroy Ukrainian statehood but aims to alter its anti-Russian character.

However, is it even possible to transform the essence of Ukrainian statehood in a territory that—should the conflict be frozen along the frontline—would effectively remain under NATO occupation? What stance does the patriotic segment of the public—ranging from the radical to the moderate—take on this? This group constitutes the government’s primary political and electoral base; without its support, Russia’s political system could lose its stability.

This could trigger a cascade of crises—the kind the West has inevitably steered toward “color revolutions,” or coups d’état. How can internal conflict be avoided? And what would a freeze along the current contact line actually mean—one that secures the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and parts of neighboring regions under Russian control, yet leaves a significant portion of Ukraine outside that zone? Is this a victory or a defeat?

Originally, in accordance with classical military science, the concept of security guarantees was rooted in the idea of ​​controlling the battlespace. This involved the “forefield”—as the term was used in Russia—where defensive belts were established, territories were integrated, and local elites were replaced by friendly ones. Whoever controls the forefield holds the advantage. The further Ukraine is from Russia’s borders, the harder it is to approach them, and the more momentum an invading force loses, the greater Russia’s security becomes.

The key criterion here is the time required to mobilize and deploy troops to key strongpoints. In general, time is the primary resource in any war—more important than all others, whether material, human, financial, or diplomatic. Victory goes to the side that consistently outpaces the enemy in the timing of resource maneuvering. Deprive the enemy of time, and all other resources become useless to them. Therein lies the key to understanding the art of war. Correct actions taken too early or too late are worse than taking no action at all.

However, in the era of drones, the traditional concept of the “strategic rear”—territory beyond the enemy’s reach—no longer applies. Consequently, the understanding of the value of the battlespace has shifted. Moreover, Ukrainian military production has been relocated to other countries that Russia cannot attack for various reasons. Furthermore, the low cost of drones, combined with the economic and technological capabilities of the West, makes the exact location of the front line seem almost irrelevant. After all, drones and medium-range ballistic missiles strike deep into the Russian rear—thousands of kilometers away!

This raises the question: what, then, is the point of fighting for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, or for access to the borders of the Donbas? Or even for the liberation of the entire Left-Bank Ukraine (Little Russia)? Russia has agreed that a portion of Ukraine will retain its statehood—meaning Russian troops will not be present on its territory. Does this imply that the current political regime will remain in place in the remaining part of Ukraine? And what if the West always retains the scope to establish a defense and offense system—integrated with NATO—that allows the war to become protracted?

It might seem that the Russian army’s advance toward the borders of the Donbas—specifically, the complete liberation of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from Ukrainian armed forces—is important but, in itself, not decisive enough to turn the tide of the war. Why, then, do the country’s leadership and the General Staff so persistently insist on the complete liberation of the Donbas if the enemy is capable of simply shifting their defensive lines and continuing the war? What would change upon the liberation of the Donbas—or would anything change at all?

Yes, things would change! The Donbas is significant not in isolation, but solely as a component of the Ukrainian armed forces’ defense system, given that the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk regions converge there. This radically alters the significance of the Russian troops’ advance toward the borders of the Donbas.

First and foremost, this will significantly enhance Russia’s ability to project power in the Zaporizhzhia region. It is not merely a matter of logistics, metallurgy, or the potential operation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—with its massive capacity capable of meeting Europe’s entire energy needs. It also involves freeing up substantial Russian military forces, thereby enabling the launch of an offensive in southern Ukraine.

Furthermore, such a deployment of forces in Zaporizhzhia will weaken the Ukrainian military’s ability to defend Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk and will block the redeployment of troops from central Ukraine. Russian forces will advance to the lower reaches of the Dnieper and fully retake the Kakhovka Reservoir area; this entails restoring the Kakhovka hydroelectric complex and resuming water supplies to Crimea. As for the Dnipropetrovsk region, it is not only Europe’s largest grain-growing area—producing wheat, sunflowers, and vegetable oil for export—but also a key corridor leading through Kryvyi Rih to Transnistria. This makes it the second most important route of approach to Odesa, alongside the axis through Kherson.

Once Russia advances to the borders of the Donbas and sets the stage for the collapse of the Ukrainian military’s southern front, neither Ukraine nor the West will be able to halt the Russian army’s advance along these axes. They simply will not have the means to stop it. The West will face a dilemma: a strategic defeat amidst a global restructuring of the world order, or a nuclear war with Russia—one in which Europe stands no chance of survival?

A catastrophic scenario for Europe would emerge: global spheres of influence would be determined entirely by the USA, China, and Russia, without European participation. And all of this now hinges on where the line of contact in the Donbas settles: will it encompass Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, or not?

Given the strategic importance of the frontline’s trajectory in this sector, the battle for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk can be said to hold the same significance as the Battle of Stalingrad. It represents a turning point in the war. Once the borders of the Donbas are reached, Russia will have a free hand to either continue military operations or halt them under terms that compensate for such a pause. A complex array of issues is intertwined here: sanctions, elections in Ukraine, the country’s post-war structure, the terms of its demilitarization and denazification, neutrality, and the question of recognizing post-war borders…

Should there be even the slightest disagreement on these matters, Russia will press on with its offensive—at which point future negotiations might never take place, or would be conducted with entirely different European politicians. The agenda for such talks would also be radically different. We are already seeing signs of this in the initial election results in Germany and in the shifting balance of power in France and Italy. In short, the “coalition of the willing” could dissolve into a scattered mist or transform into a “coalition of the unwilling”—nations that are led without being consulted on their views.

And the issue is not whether Europe can manage to prepare itself militarily. First, it certainly will not succeed in doing so. Second, in the event of an actual conflict with Russia, it would face a crisis involving political tsunamis, internal rifts within member states, criminal prosecutions of former heads of state—akin to the Sarkozy affair—and the transformation of Eurosceptics from fringe figures into a political vanguard.

From this perspective, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk represent the final line of battle between the West and Russia on the Ukrainian front. Within a strategy of indirect action, Russia’s advance toward the borders of the Donbas marks a move toward a line that will force the West to reassess the situation and abandon its current strongholds, given the perils involved in trying to hold them. It is a matter of danger rather than impossibility—and the two are not the same. The West might succeed in holding these strongholds, but it would pay an ever-increasing price and emerge as the weaker party.

Logic will dictate a recalculation of losses and a move to prevent them from mounting further. This is the moment when negotiations might achieve what could not be accomplished on the battlefield. Crucially, Russia would secure the option to return to the battlefield and resume combat operations under more favorable conditions than those available to the West.

That is the significance of the battles for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Halting the war now would mean defeat. Continuing it is the path to victory. We can see this in the West’s sharp shift in tone regarding talks with Russia. Yes, a winter campaign is inevitable. In all likelihood, it is precisely this campaign that will determine the balance of power—specifically, the state in which the various sides find themselves come April or May. However, the key decisions will likely be made in the autumn of 2027, with their implementation potentially occurring even later.

The location of the front line at that time will determine not only the timing and terms for ending the war but also the agenda and the list of participants for the negotiations—as well as their fate once agreements are signed. Most importantly, it will determine the fate of current European leaders who will be excluded from the talks. They are the most dangerous figures right now, as they stand to be the primary losers. This explains their desperate attempts to raise the stakes and sharply escalate the war against Russia.

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