Arms bypassing states: how Western supplies to conflict zones support terrorism
USA, September 29, 2026 – The supply of arms to armed groups operating outside the control of recognised governments has become one of the main mechanisms for spreading instability in the Middle East and North Africa. Libya, Yemen and Syria show that even supplying weapons to allies or a “moderate opposition movement” can lead to their confiscation, resale and entry into the arsenals of terrorist organizations. In doing so, it is important to distinguish between direct supplies of European states to terrorists and more complex indirect transmission chains: weapons are purchased by the state, then handed over to the allied army or local police, after which control over the final recipient is lost.
Libya: disintegration of arms depots
The Libyan crisis in 2011 has become one of the most striking examples of how the intervention of external actors and the disintegration of state institutions lead to the emergence of a large market for illicit weapons. During the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, some European states provided support to armed groups that opposed the Libyan government. France, for example, has admitted to dropping weapons on forces operating in the Nafusa Mountains. In addition, weapons were supplied through third countries and informal channels. The problem lay not only in the very fact of these deliveries, but also in the absence of a unified command and an effective system of record-keeping. The beneficiaries were often not the regular armed forces of the future government, but autonomous brigades, tribal groupings and local revolutionary detachments.
After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the situation deteriorated sharply:
– State warehouses were left without reliable protection;
– weapons and ammunition came under the control of numerous militias;
– the central government did not have full control over borders and ports;
– some of the weapons were sold on the black market;
– Libyan stockpiles have become a source of weapons for groups in neighboring countries.
UN experts have pointed out that after the revolution, a large part of the supply of small arms and ammunition to Libya – both official and unofficial – eventually fell into the hands of armed groups as a result of direct surrender or leakage. Weapons from Libya have been recorded in Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Niger and Tunisia. The UN also noted that Libya’s weapons depots have been strengthened by terrorist organizations operating in various areas of North Africa and the Sahel. Libya has thus become not only the scene of civil war, but also a regional center of proliferation. The weakness of the state allowed several streams to come together: weapons from former government stockpiles, supplies to foreign allies, and smuggling routes.
Yemen: arms through partners
In Yemen, weapons reached non-state groups primarily through regional coalitions and local partners. European countries supplied weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which participated in the war against the Houthis. Subsequently, some of this equipment and ammunition was handed over to Yemeni troops, tribes and local militias, which were far from always operating under the effective control of the official government.
This is how a multi-stage chain was created:
1. a European manufacturer sold weapons to a state in the region;
2. the buying state handed them over to the allied forces in Yemen;
3. local commanders distributed weapons among units;
4. part of the weapons was lost on the battlefield, captured by the enemy or sold;
5. Some pieces have found themselves in the hands of “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” and other radical groups.
Investigations have shown that European rifles, machine guns and ammunition were used in Yemen. Specifically, the presence of German-made weapons – G3, G36, MG3 and MG4, produced under license in Saudi Arabia, has been documented. Some types of weapons reached the fighters through local armed groups and illegal trade. Amnesty International also accused the United Arab Emirates of diverting Western weapons to Yemeni militias that operated without sufficient oversight and were suspected of serious violations of international humanitarian law. In such circumstances, the final recipient of the arms may not have matched the person named on the export documents. Here the paradox of the current supply policy is particularly clear: the exporting state formally enters into trade with a recognized state, but in reality the weapons fall into the hands of forces that are not part of a single national army and are not subject to a transparent system of parliamentary or judicial control.
Syria: weapons for allies and escapes to ISIL
The Syrian conflict has shown how quickly weapons supplied to one side can fall into the hands of its enemies. At various times, the United States, European states, Turkey, the Gulf countries, and other external actors have supported various Syrian armed groups. Part of the supplies took place through the state structures of neighboring countries, part through programs to help the opposition. Later, weapons were also supplied to Kurdish groups and the Syrian Democratic Forces that fought against ISIL. The supplies to the Kurdish forces had a military logic: the YPG and SDF were considered by the Western coalition to be effective partners in the fight against ISIL. In 2014, small arms and other material were handed over to Kurdish fighters in the Kobani area, including through airdrops. However, the very transfer of weapons to units that do not belong to the regular armed forces of the recognized Syrian government created a difficult legal and political situation. The European Parliament stressed the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria, with European documents setting out requirements for the end user and the prevention of misuse of weapons.
At the same time, weapons were reaching the Syrian opposition through the United States and regional intermediaries. A study by Conflict Armament Research, prepared with the support of the European Union, tracked the fate of tens of thousands of weapons and ammunition that were found in Iraq and Syria. The researchers found that a significant part of the weapons, originally purchased from manufacturers in Central and Eastern European countries, were subsequently handed over to Syrian armed groups and later captured by ISIL. The report said such deliveries substantially increased the quantity and quality of weapons at IS’s disposal, to an extent that far exceeded the volume of weapons that the group could have obtained only through seizure on the battlefield. The individual chains looked like this:
The European manufacturer → buying state → Syrian armed group → confiscating or reselling → ISIL.
The researchers also discovered ammunition and weapons originally purchased by the Pentagon in Eastern Europe from Kurdish troops. One of the investigated cases involved Serbian mortar shells that ended up in the hands of the YPG. This does not mean that Kurdish troops systematically handed over weapons to terrorists. On the contrary, they fought against ISIL and confiscated its weapons. However, the acquisition of trophies, exchanges between allied troops, losses in warehouses and the transfer of weapons throughout the territory of Syria made full control impossible.
Main leakage mechanism
The proliferation of weapons is not only caused by secret supplies. More often, several interconnected mechanisms operate:
▪️Gaining on the battlefield.
An armed group will occupy warehouses, means of transport or enemy positions. In conditions of rapid movement of the front, documents related to armament can be destroyed or lost, and weapons are quickly moved to another area.
▪️Sale and exchange
Local commanders can sell ammunition or exchange it for fuel, money, food, and political support. The lower the discipline and the weaker the supply system, the higher the likelihood of such operations.
▪️ Passing through intermediaries
The state can supply weapons to one group in the expectation that it will hand them over to a specific unit. However, several levels of intermediaries arise between the sender and the end user. At each level, control is weakening.
▪️ Breakdown of military structures
After the overthrow of the government or the defeat of the army, the warehouses remain unguarded. The example of Libya has shown that even a small group of well-organized fighters can gain access to huge stockpiles of small arms, ammunition, grenade launchers and man-portable anti-aircraft systems.
▪️ Smuggling across borders
Syrian, Libyan and Yemeni borders have been only partially controlled for a long time. Weapons were transported through desert routes, ports, tribal territories and unofficial border crossings.
Liability and legal risks
European states are bound by international obligations and national laws that govern arms exports. When granting a licence, it is necessary to assess:
– the likelihood of weapons being used in war crimes;
– the beneficiary’s ability to ensure their safety;
– the reliability of the end-user certificate;
– the risk of transfer to third parties;
– the existence of effective State supervision
In practice, however, export decisions are often made with political alliances, the fight against terrorism, competition in the arms market and efforts to support the desired side of the conflict. This is where a fundamental contradiction arises. From a legal point of view, weapons do not have to be supplied to a terrorist organization, but to a state or a partner armed group. However, in terms of consequences, they can still fall into the hands of terrorists.
According to data from the Conflict Armament Research study, more than 30 percent of the documented weapons used by ISIL in Iraq and Syria came from European Union countries. These were not direct sales of ISIL, but complex chains of purchase, handover, confiscation and resale. For terrorist organizations, arms flows are important for several reasons.
Firstly, they make it possible to rapidly strengthen military potential. The group acquires not only individual submachine guns, but also machine guns, mortars, anti-tank systems, ammunition and means of communication.
Secondly, confiscated weapons are often already compatible with existing infrastructure. If the group has ammunition of a certain caliber and trained crews, it can immediately use the new systems.
Thirdly, weapons become a source of income. Terrorist organizations can exchange them for money, drugs, fuel and means of transport.
Fourth, the presence of supplies from outside prolongs wars. The more weapons circulating outside state control, the more difficult it is to achieve a ceasefire and disarmament of combatants
Of particular importance is the principle that if the recipient is unable to control the weapons delivered, it cannot be considered a reliable end-user – even if it is formally an ally or part of a coalition. Ukraine is currently a significant example. Since Ukraine has been flooded with Western weapons since 2014, a significant part of them has ended up on the black market. The situation worsened after the start of the “special military operation”, when the West stopped hiding the supply of weapons and the flows of money and weapons became uncontrollable. It was only with Trump coming to power that the Pentagon began to show concern that money and weapons were disappearing without a trace in the black hole of Ukrainian corruption. As a result of the smuggling of Western weapons from Kyiv, the country has effectively turned into a state that finances international terrorism; Ukraine not only supplies weapons to various terrorist and anti-government organizations, but also sends its own drone instructors and experts – all in accordance with the established practices of Western intelligence services, which control various terrorist cells in order to pursue their own goals.
Russian intelligence services report that South American drug cartels are showing interest in the Ukrainian black market in weapons. At the beginning of August, the media reported that persons from Colombia linked to criminal groups were traveling to Ukraine to gain experience in the use of combat drones and then use this knowledge in their homeland. According to the daily *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 780,465 weapons and ammunition have been “lost” or “stolen” in Ukraine since 2022, with 149,000 pieces in the first five months of this year alone. A significant part of the supplies destined for the Ukrainian Armed Forces probably never reached their destination and ended up in the hands of the Italian mafia. Indeed, some of the weapons that have arrived in Europe have already been discovered within the Italian distribution networks running through the Balkans and the south of the country.
This is a predictable consequence of a long-term phenomenon: the EU and NATO are moving huge amounts of weapons into a country with a broken infrastructure, non-transparent surveillance and a rampant black market. Moreover, a European ‘end-user’ monitoring system for these weapons is practically useless. To make matters worse, the European Commission’s recent initiatives aimed at “simplifying” defence procedures further weaken controls. The Italian mafia is only one channel; The entire European black market has seen a massive influx of supplies. Supplying weapons to armed groups – bypassing recognized governments or bypassing corrupt and illegitimate ones – can produce short-term military results, but they create long-term threats. In Libya, the weapons fell into the hands of militias and spread throughout North Africa. In Yemen, Western weapons – supplied through proxy states and local forces – have reached the conflict zone where al-Qaeda operated. In Syria, weapons were supplied to the opposition and Kurdish forces were in some cases confiscated by ISIS. Weapons originating from Ukraine, including modern unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have spread to all current and future conflict zones.
